Wisconsin Conceals the Right to Carry

March 8th, 2010

Last month, there was a rally in Waukesha County supporting gun rights in Wisconsin; the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel covered the event in an article here. Many of the article’s comments about the rally related to the problems created by Wisconsin’s uniquely restrictive statewide gun laws. Wisconsin is the only State with a complete ban on carrying a concealed weapon; other states either authorize a permit system to carry concealed, or have enacted carry-concealed statutes that contain explicit exceptions for specific locations or circumstances. This outright ban exists despite the fact that Wisconsin’s State Constitution guarantees citizens the right to keep and bear arms for security, defense, hunting, recreation, or any other lawful purpose.

Mastantuono Law Office has extensive experience representing individuals in criminal cases dealing with gun laws, and with petitions for property return to get our clients’ firearms back from the government. These efforts have led to noteworthy success for our clients. For example, Mastantuono Law Office represented a Milwaukee pizza delivery driver who made national headlines for being the unfortunate victim of several robbery attempts while he was working. After using a firearm to defend himself and ward off his attackers, the Milwaukee District Attorney’s Office charged our client with carrying a concealed weapon (CCW), a criminal misdemeanor offense. The State charged our client despite concluding that he acted in lawful self-defense when he discharged his weapon, instead basing a CCW charge on his decision to carry a weapon just prior to being attacked. That’s right – the State decided that he acted in lawful self-defense while using a firearm to defend himself, but that he shouldn’t have had the firearm with him in the first place. Mastantuono Law Office moved to dismiss the CCW charge, asserting that our client acted within his Wisconsin Constitutional privilege to go armed for the purposes of self-defense and security. Link to Journal Sentinel article here. Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Daniel Noonan agreed, throwing out the case. Milwaukee Journal Sentinel article: Driver’s Gun Charge Tossed.

Despite having its case thrown out, the State retained possession of our client’s weapon, forcing a contested motion for property return. Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Jeffery Kremers denied our client’s request to have his firearm returned, and even denied his request for a hearing on the matter. Link to Journal Sentinel article here. We appealed. The Wisconsin Court of Appeals overturned Judge Kremers, ordering that a hearing be held on the matter. Upon hearing our claim of Constitutional privilege in defense of the property forfeiture, Milwaukee County Circuit Court Judge Kevin Martens agreed that our client had exercised his Constitutional right to bear a firearm, and ordered his property returned.

Throughout these proceedings, the courts focused only on the issue of whether the CCW law was unconstitutional as applied to our client – and ruled that it was. Unsatisfied with this result, Mastantuono Law Office challenged the constitutionality of the CCW statute on its face as applied to all Wisconsin residents in a Petition for Review to the Wisconsin Supreme Court. We moved to have the CCW statute struck down. A link to our Petition is here. The Wisconsin Supreme Court declined to hear our challenge, leaving in limbo clear guidelines for determining when Wisconsin residents can lawfully assert their Constitutional privilege to lawfully carry a firearm. This leaves the authority to make that determination in the hands of the executive branch of government, as exercised by individual prosecutors. Since prosecutors and local policy can vary from county to county, and even within the same county, Wisconsin residents are left in the dark about whether carrying a firearm is lawful or unlawful, until an individualized, after-the-fact determination. The result is the government having all of the power to make these determinations on a case-by-case basis: a dangerous situation for those asserting their Constitutional right to bear arms.

Since the Supreme Court denied our Petition, gun rights issues in Wisconsin clearly remain in the forefront, as evidenced by the rally in Waukesha County, as well as a recent United States Supreme Court oral argument on the Constitutionality of state and local gun control laws, discussed in an article here.

For those seeking a more detailed legal analysis, a portion of our Supreme Court Petition supporting review follows:

STATEMENT OF CRITERIA SUPPORTING REVIEW AND SATISFYING EXCEPTIONS TO MOOTNESS

This appeal presents substantial questions regarding the reach and effect of Art. I, § 25 of the Wisconsin Constitution (enacted in 1998), the impact of the “fundamental right” created by that provision on Wis. Stat. § 941.23, and the process established by this Court in Hamdan, by which the trial courts are to determine on a case-by-case basis whether an individual has exercised his or her “fundamental right” or committed a crime. This appeal asks the Court to revisit Hamdan, Cole, and their limited progeny, with the benefit of over five and a half-years of judicial experience in applying the Hamdan framework in individual cases.

The Hamdan decision concludes with the following advice to the legislative branch and the recognition that there would exist “a continuing dilemma until the legislature acts to clarify the law”:

We urge the legislature to thoughtfully examine Wis. Stat. § 941.23 in the wake of the amendment and to consider the possibility of a licensing or permit system for persons who have a good reason to carry a concealed weapon. We happily concede that the legislature is better able than this court to determine public policy on firearms and other weapons.

. . .

In the meantime, we must give effect to the constitutional right embodied in Article I, Section 25.

Hamdan at ¶¶ 85, 86. The legislature has yet to address the “dilemma” perceived by the Court.

Petitioner respectfully contends that his case demonstrates that the Hamdan framework has not proven amendable to knowable, consistent, non-arbitrary, and objectively reviewable administration. In making it impossible for one to know whether carrying a concealed firearm for legitimate self-defense and security purposes is the exercise of a fundamental right or a crime until after the conclusion of substantial, typically criminal, litigation, the framework has fallen short of the Court’s goal of giving meaningful effect to Art. I, § 25. It has also compromised basic principles of due process and fair notice. Hamdan does not provide meaningful guidance for the trial courts and bar, leaving them to struggle anew in each case.

Specifically noting that in this very case, different judges came to different conclusions on largely identical sets of facts, Judge Martens expressed the ongoing dilemma facing the bench, the bar, and would-be defendants:

[I] do wonder whether ultimately it’s fair to individuals who have a genuine interest in security to essentially subject them to prosecution and then have a court after the fact be the Monday morning quarterback with the attorney’s help and decide, well, in your case it’s okay but in someone else’s case maybe the cashier next to you, it’s not, so I have real concerns about that.

R.19 (Pet. App. 153-154).

Over five and a half years since Hamdan’s call for legislative action to resolve this “continuing dilemma,” Judge Martens concludes this passage by reiterating that “legislative guidance would be extremely helpful and valuable.” Id.

Petitioner suggests that Hamdan has likely had the unintended consequence of inhibiting needed legislative guidance by diluting both the urgency of the need for such guidance and the legislative branch’s ultimate responsibility for providing it.

This case exemplifies that experience over the intervening years has shown that Hamdan has failed to effectively serve its purpose. It has had unintended consequences, is burdensome to the bench and bar, to defendants, and to those who desire to exercise a fundamental constitutional right without fear and uncertainty.

For these reasons, Petitioner suggests that this case meets the criteria for review and should not be deemed moot.

In addition to work described above, Mastantuono Law Office has handled numerous other cases dealing with the right to bear arms. Our Office currently represents a Minneapolis firefighter who shot and killed a man who broke into our client’s home in rural Burnett County, Wisconsin. Despite our client’s strong claim of self-defense, the State charged him with Second-degree Intentional homicide, alleging that he had a real, but unreasonable belief that he was in grave danger when he fired his gun. All charges were ultimately dismissed after our Office successfully argued that the State violated our client’s Constitutional Due Process rights when it lost key evidence supporting our client’s innocence. Link to Minneapolis Star Tribune article here, and Intercounty Leader article here.

Mastantuono Law Office’s practice is Statewide, focusing on representation of individuals and organizations accused of crime, and who are the target of government investigations. We are available for all inquiries at (414) 276-8662, or by contacting us through our website: www.MilwaukeeCriminalLawyers.com.

Rebecca Coffee,

Craig Mastantuono.

Juvenile Law Injustice in Wisconsin

February 17th, 2010

Change can sometimes be swift in Wisconsin when momentum gathers behind a rotten idea. The drastic revision to Wisconsin’s Children’s Code in the 1990s, fueled by the hype and scare tactics employed by certain criminal justice leaders at that time, serves as an example. Wisconsin lowered the age when certain juvenile delinquency charges can be filed against a child from 12 to 10, lowered the age when a child becomes an adult in the criminal justice system from 18 to 17, and enacted a host of other harsh changes to a previously good Code, all aimed at treating juveniles like adults. Problem is, they are not adults. That basic assumption is premised on literally hundreds of years of criminal justice thinking and court jurisprudence, and was turned on its head in a relative heartbeat by a group of folks who scared the hell out of people that a 16-year-old was going to shoot them. By the way, the old Code always had a mechanism for waiving the 16-year-old shooters into the adult system. The general result of the 1990s changes? Attorneys like myself now represent a lot of 17-year-old high school seniors in adult criminal court for petty theft, fighting, or possessing a bag of marijuana. What a waste. Only now, 14 years later, is Wisconsin starting to look at hitting the partial reset button on this. Local writer/journalist Doug Hissom has a good article about the  Wisconsin Legislature’s pending reform bill on juvenile law published at OnMilwaukee (direct link to article).

I wrote and published on this issue in the Milwaukee Journal Sentinal 7 years ago, after defending a 10-year-old child in a homicide case involving the tragic and bizarre mob beating death of a Milwaukee man. We were ultimately able to get the criminal delinquency charges against the child dismissed, due to a challenge to his competency. A hard-fought win, but not a huge surprise: he was 10. That original J/S article is reprinted below:

Commission Needed to Reform Juvenile Law by Craig Mastantuono; this article appeared in the Crossroads Section of the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel on May 18, 2003.

“You scared?”  Nods – yes.

“Of what?”

“I don’t know.”

These are notes from a client visit I made last October at the Milwaukee County Juvenile Detention Center.  I was the lawyer for the 10-year-old child accused of participating in the beating death of Charles Young, Jr.  That 10-year-old child.  The one who made a splash on the national media scene last fall by potentially becoming the youngest child ever charged with homicide in an adult criminal court in the U.S.  I didn’t do the research on that statistic – I read it in the paper.

The Milwaukee County District Attorney ended that possibility early on and decided to pursue a delinquency charge in juvenile court.  In December, a Milwaukee County Children’s Court Judge ruled that the child was not competent to stand trial in the juvenile delinquency proceeding.  The Court followed the joint findings of three psychologists who examined the child for competency.  That ruling effectively ended the criminal prosecution, and resulted in the filing of a protection and services petition in the child’s case.  In late February, the Judge entered disposition findings on that petition, and sent the child to a residential treatment center in the city.  It was a modest hearing compared to earlier hearings in the case – no witness testimony, no cross-examinations, no media reporters.  Just the Judge talking to the child, telling him and his family what needs to happen to eventually return the boy home.  After the hearing he cried.  He cried like a child – upset, confused, and unable to express himself.  Not sure what he was scared of, but still scared.

The criminal prosecutions of the many youths accused in Mr. Young’s death present so many questions.  Early on, the questions centered on community shock and frustration.  How could something so awful happen?  How could so many young people be involved?  Where were the families?  Who is to blame?  As these cases proceed through the court system, the questions should not end.  What can we learn from this?  And when a youth – especially one as young as 10 years old – is accused of a crime, how should the police, lawyers, and courts address it?  Two areas ripe for local discussion and study emerge from these cases: juvenile competency to proceed in a criminal prosecution, and police interrogation of juvenile suspects.

In March 2003 the Milwaukee Journal Sentinel published the findings of a psychological study conducted on juvenile competency (Some young don’t understand trial, team finds, Milwaukee Journal Sentinel, March 3, 2003).  The study, conducted in several national locations by a team of psychologists, found that juveniles 15 years old and younger are at a much higher risk of lacking the mental competence to stand trial in a criminal proceeding than older juveniles and adults (The MacArthur Juvenile Adjudicative Competence Study, www.mac-adoldev-juvjustice.org).  Competency in the legal sense relates to a person’s mental abilities to understand a criminal prosecution, to make decisions about the proceedings, and to assist an attorney in his own defense.  In adult cases, lack of basic competency most often is the result of mental illness.  In juvenile cases, cognitive developmental factors relating to age are much more prevalent in impairing an accused’s competency.  In other words, children under 15 likely have not yet developed the intellectual, emotional, and decision-making abilities necessary to allow them to understand and participate meaningfully in a criminal prosecution.  Since the United States Supreme Court’s interpretation of our Constitution requires that those accused of a crime have a basic ability to understand the proceedings, competency is a big deal.  Each State must ensure that this fundamental fairness is honored in its own criminal prosecutions.

In 1996, Wisconsin changed its Children’s Code in response to a perceived need to more aggressively prosecute accused youths.  Among the changes was a lowering of the age when delinquency prosecutions could be filed from 12 years to 10 years old, and allowing original adult court jurisdiction for children as young as 10 years old accused of certain homicide offenses. These changes were set against a centuries-old history in American and English jurisprudence of treating children accused of crime differently, to reflect their age.  As the studies emerge warning that criminally accused youth are at high risk of being incompetent, one must now ask: is Wisconsin behind the learning curve?  Two Milwaukee judges have now ruled that two of the boys accused in the Young case are incompetent to stand trial, even with the assistance of a lawyer.  This begs the question: how were they deemed competent to be interrogated by police detectives following arrest, scared, alone and without the counsel of a lawyer or parent?

In Chicago, recent cases resulting in wrongful prosecutions of youth who gave false confessions to police led to a study and report by a cross-disciplinary Juvenile Competency Commission (Juvenile Competency Commission, Final Report, 8/9/01, Michael J. Howlett, Jr., Chairman.).  That commission of community members, psychologists, judges, lawyers, prosecutors, and police, recommended reform in how accused juveniles are interrogated as suspects, and prosecuted in courts.  The recommendations attempt to balance the community’s need to investigate and solve crime with the community’s interest in safeguarding childrens’ rights.  Among the recommended reforms are: required parental notification when a juvenile is taken into custody, videotaping of interrogations, suppression of juvenile confessions given without counsel, and civil prosecution of children deemed incompetent and of children under 12.  A similar commission should be formed here.

There are no easy answers to these questions, only more questions.  But the criminal law and courts are our greatest attempt as a society to intervene when something goes wrong, when something so bad happens that a formal and forceful intervention is required.  We should act when these bad things happen, and try to right the wrong.  We should also explore further what to do when children are accused of crime, and to try and get it right.
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Welcome.

December 14th, 2009